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THE TRANSFER OF HUMAN CAPITAL
ABSTRACT
Most of our productive knowledge was handed down io us by previous generations. The
transfer of knowledge from the old to the young is therefore a cornerstone of productivity growth.
We study this process in a model in which the old sell knowledge to the young --oldworkers
train the young, and charge them for this service. We take an information-theoretic approach in
which training occurs if a young agent watches an old worker perform a task. This assumption
has plenty of empirical support —intheir first three months on the job, young workers spend
about five times as long watching others work as they do in formal training programs.
Equilibrium is not constrained Pareto optimal. The old have private information, and this
gives rise to an adverse selection problem: some old agents manage to sell skills that the young
would not buy (if only they knew exactly what they were buying). We derive the implications
for the lifetime of technological lines, and we show that the model generates a negative relation
between a firm's productivity and us probability of failure.
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1.Introduction
How efficiently is productive knowledge passed on from one generation to the next? Some of
this knowledge is handed down informally in the family, and some of it is taught in schools. A third
mechanism is learning on the job: acquiring productive knowledge through the process of on-the-job
training and learning by doing. Our paper focuses on the third mechanism.
Two prominent equilibrium models of learning on the job are those of Prescott and Boyd (1987),
and Chad and Hopenhayn (1991).They assumethat the process by which one worker learns from
other workers can be (and is) fully internalized by firms . Our approach is similar in spirit, but our
conclusions diffcr from theirs. We explicitly model the information that the process of training
transfers, and this leads to the conclusion that the market for on-the-job training is plagued by the
efficiency problem that usually crops up with markets for information.
We study an overlapping generations economy in which people live for two periods. An old
worker trains the young worker who works alongside him. This training consists of an explicit
mechanism by which information is revealed to the young worker. The information consists of
observations of past signals about the unknown parameters of the production process that the old and
the young worker alike both use. So although agents die, their information can survive for ever.
There are two fundamental differences between this economy and a frictioniess one in which a
pair of infinitely lived workers were to share their information instantaneously; both of them imply
a level of output that is lower in the overlapping generations economy than in the infmite horizon
one. The first ditlbrence occurs because the transfer of knowledge is assumed to take time: the young
worker must watch the old worker dc the job'. Although the young worker can work and watch at
the same time (so that training is assumed to involve no foregone output cost), information still
accumulates more slowly than it would if an infinitely lived agents were to observe the same signals.
'The assumption that the transfer of knowledge occurs through watching is backed by a study
by Barron, Black and Loewenstein (1989) who report (in table 1) that in a sample of some 2,000
employers, the typical worker spent a least five times as many hours watching others work as he
did in formal training programs.
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This is because there is no way for the old worker to pass on the information that he gains from the
signal that he sees in the second period of his life. Therefore, in the overlapping generations
economy, the two—worker team will have only half the productive information that a pair of infinitely
lived individuals would have, and a permanently lower level of output around trend. This first
difference therefore simply reflects the added constraints that we impose on informational transfer
among people.
The second difference stems from a failure in the market for information. We follow Prescott,
Boyd, Chari, and Hopenhayn assume that the old sell training to the young. The content of the
training is known to the old worker, but not to a prospective young buyer. The young worker
therefore enters a match with an old worker based on what he knows about the population of all old
workers. Old workers with inferior skills exploit this, and in equilibrium too much training occurs
in comparison to what a central planner could achieve through a tax scheme. Equilibrium allows the
survival of some skills that the planner would prefer to extinguish so as to release more young agents
to start new technologies. In this sense, competitive equilibrium involves too much resistance to
change.
2. Model
There will be many technological lines. We first describe what happens within one such line.
2.1. Within a Technological "Line:" A technological line has many grades indexed by n=O,l,2,...
The production function and information structure within a technological line are taken from
Jovanovic and Nyarko (1994). If an agent uses grade n at date t, his decision z yields net output
q via the production function
q = y'[l - (y,,, - z)2]. (1)
Here YN is a random variable that acts as an unknown "target", and is observed after z is chosen.
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Since y ? I, a larger n denotes a better grade. Since y is observed regardless of what z is
chosen, z does not affect learning. Assume that everyone is risk-neutral, so that each agent
maximizes his ownexpected output. LetE() denote the conditional expectation at date t. The
decisionthat maximizes 131(q) in (1)is
z=E1(yJ . (2)
The random target fluctuates around a grade-specific parameter O:
yin= + (3)
Theagent does not know °a• He can observe y, but only if at date t he uses grade n. Let
N(js,o2) denote the normal distribution with mean s and variance 02.Assumethat w1 is an i.i.d
variate, with marginal distribution N(O, a). Since E(wj =0,equation (2) implies that the optimal
decision is
z =E(OJ, (4)
and (I) -(4)implythatexpected net output is
E(q) ='([I - VariO)-2] , (5)
where Var1@) denotes the conditional variance. If he uses grade n, he observes Yn and learns more
about en' which allows him to make a better decision z. This reduces Var1(0j, and raises his
expected net output.Indeed, suppose that the agent has a prior belief over 0, which is N(m,x.,.)
where
and x,=var1 0,. (6)
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Thenupon observing y,,itis easyto veri' thatthe updated beliefs over @ will be normal with
variance given by the function
h (x)o1x/(cç2+x); (7)
in particular the posterior variance is ; = h1(x,JThe updated posterior mean is given by
+ y,/o2}. (8)
However this learning process is bounded: Using grade n forever allows the agent to learn 0,,
completely so that E,(q) — y[I - a.,} <.
2.2. Upgrading Within a Technoiogical Line:Successive grades are linked as follows:
• €, n I (9)
The c's are lid with distributionN(O,o2). c,÷and 0,, are independentofeach other. Agents
know a and o2, but they do not see the C's or c's.
If x,,'is an agent's posterior variance over 0, at the end of the period, then from (9) the
agent's posterior variance, x, • over 00+1, will be given by the function h2 below of ;
h2(x) = ax + q2 . (10)
Hence that x,1 = 1i2(x,,').Suppose that at the beginning of the period an agent has a posterior
variance over 0,, equal tox,,.Suppose that agent uses grade n. Then from (7) and (10) we
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conclude that the mapping from x, into is given by the mapping
B(x) = h2(h1(x)) , (11)
so that x,1 = B(x). If m, is the mean of the beliefs over 0,, then from (8) and (9), after y0 has
been observed the posterior mean over O,, will be
rn,,, = a'%1(xj(m,,,x, + y,/a2}. (12)
It is easily verified that B has a fixed point which we denote by it. (See fig. 1). We assume
thatal < I.The map on the right-hand side of eq. (10) then has a fixed point
oi(1 -a) . (13)
From k iterates of the function B converge monotonically to. (See fig. 1).
[Figure 1 about here]
We suppose that the ex ante distribution over 00, the parameter of grade 0, is its stationary
distribution - N(tl,k).We assume that
1-i-a2 >0. (14)
This means that the ex ante expected output on grade zero is positive.
2.3.Switching to a NewTechnological Line:We supposethat there is a continuum of
technological lines available. Ex ante, each technological line is the same. Each technological line
has an associated sequence of grades n=0, 1,2,..., and parameters {0j,, as described in sections 2.1
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and 2.2. The (OJ1sequence associated withone technologicaltineis independent of the sequence
associated with any other technological line. We impose the assumption
(Al) On an untried technological line, the cx ante belief over O (and hence over O for each
nl,2,3,...) is N(O,i).
At date t, any agent can choose on anytechnologicalline anygraden which is less than or
equal to t. This means that the "production frontier" is moving out in step with time. (In Jovanovic
and Nyarko (1994) this was called the Chari-flopenhayn assumption.)
Suppose the agent is contemplating using a technological tine over which he has no
information. From (Al),hiscx ante variance over O is equal to A for all n.Then (14) impliesthat
his expected output is the highest if he sets nt. If an agent abandons a technological line whose
grade is on the frontier, and starts a new technological line, the switch will represent a lateralswitch
- i.e., to the same grade n=t. (Jovanovic and Nyarko (1994) had only one technological line. Lateral
switches were therefore not allowed in that paper.)In the model we present in the next section,
some agents will indeed make lateral switches.
3.TheOverlappine Generations Structure
We shall assume an overlapping generations structure with two-period lives. People are risk-
neutral, with lifetime preferences c,ouag+ 6c014 where cy0g and c01 denote the consumption when
young and when old respectively, and where 8 is the discount factor which we assume satisfies O<öC
l/y.
Ifthe young and the old work together, the young can learn from the old. We shall refer to
an old agent as "the foreman". A young agent working with a foreman will be referred to as "the
apprentice."All decisions are made at the beginning of a period. Anything learned during the
period can not affect decisions until the following period.
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We shall make the following assumption:
(A2) Agents are always on the production frontier (in the sense of n=t) of whatever technological
line they are using.
We will provide justification for assumption (4.2) in Appendix B.
3.1. The Foreman's Problem: First consider an old agent - a foreman - at some date t. Suppose
that the foreman is using a technological line that has been in use since date 0. By assumption the
foremanwillbe at the frontier, and hence will be using a grade nt. Therefore n is also the age of
the technology. Suppose that the belief of the foreman over the parameter O is N(m,x). The
foreman will operate that grade according to (4) and will receive an expected payoff equal to y'(l-
o2-x). The foreman at the beginning of the period also has to decide on whether or not to hire a
young agent as an apprentice. If the foreman does not hire an apprentice he receives no further
payoffs. He dies. So does that technological line!
Suppose on the other hand that the foreman does hire an apprentice. The apprentice will then
use the technology of the foreman, and his grade, to produce output As assumed in section 2.3, the
apprentice, when hired, has a belief over 0, equal to its stationary distribution, N(0,k). With this
belief the apprentice chooses an action according to (4). In particular, he chooses the action r—0.
From (1) this results in an output of I -y2. We suppose all of this output goes to the foreman. We
now state the outputs and payments in units deflated by y'.Using (3), the expected value of this
output in terms of the expectations operator of the foreman. E, is given by:
E1(l-y2) = 1-o2-x-m2. (15)
In return for these labor services, the foreman pays the apprentice an amountc, (which we shall
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characterizelater). We refer to ç as the wage rate associated with labor on grade ii. We may
represent the value function and decisionproblem ofthe foreman by
V5(m,x) aMax{l-x-a2 ,l-x-o,2+E1(1-y2)-cA}. (16)
Equation (16) indicates that the decision of the firm is to hire or not hire. The definition
in (16) isstated asif n and x are both free variables. We will later only study values of x which
are some deterministic function of n, in which case we drop the x from the specification of the value
function.
3.2. The Young Agent's Problem: The young may either be hired by a foreman or not hired. We
first consider the case of an agent who is hired.
3.2a. If agent is hired: We now consider the situation of a young agent who is hired by a foreman
using a grade n of a technological line. The two, the young and the old that is, must then use the
same grade. The apprentice will receive the amount c in his first period as payment from the
foreman. At the end of the period the young will receive information from two sources. The first
of course is the observation of y0 from use of that grade- The apprentice also learns by watching:
he obtains information from observing the foreman's decision, z. The foreman sets z to equal his
own expectation of U,, EO,. Having seen his z exactly, the apprentice learns the foreman's
rn=E{,). Each foreman has a reputation in that it's widely known how much he knows, but not
exactly what he knows. That is, the foreman's posterior variance over O will be common
knowledge. We shall denote this posterior variance by ;.Sincethe foreman's beliefs are normally
distributed, this implies that his beliefs are fully revealed once his z is observed.
These two sources of information leaves the apprentice with beliefs over anti,theparameter
of the grade, which, from (9) is easily seen to be normal with mean and variance given by
(12) and (II). In the next period the young agent becomes old. He becomes a foreman and solves
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the foreman-problem described earlier, but with grade n+l.HisLifetime return(deflatedby f) is
therefore
+ öyEjV0t1(m041,x.1)], (17)
where E3 denotes his expectations operator over ma÷i when he is young. We shall define E precisely
in equation (30).
We assume that it takes an entire period for the young to observe the action choice of the old.
In particular, the old can not merel) form the young of his beliefs at the beginning of the period
before production takes place. We envisage a situation where the young actually have to watch the
old, and that thistakesan entire period.Each apprentice therefore chooses an action z=0. The
foreman with beliefs which are normal with mean m however believes that the optimal decision is
z=m. Hence that foreman believes that the young will make "mistakes." When m is large those
mistakes are large. Hence not every foreman wilt take on an apprentice. Foremen will have skills
specific to technologies on which young agents are highly unproductive. This would be a technology
on which DI has reveated itself (to the old agent) to be targe. If hired, a young agent make costly
mistakes. Such technologies will therefore die with the foreman who operates them, and new
technologies wilt be started by young agents that did not join up with a foreman.
3.2b. "GoingitAlone:" Suppose that the young agent is not hired by the foreman who was about
to use grade n of a technological tine. The young agent then starts a new technological line. From
(A2) the young agent uses grade n of the new technological line. From (Al), the young agent's
belief over the parameter of grade n of the new technological line is N(O,i). This is of course the
same as the ex ante distribution of 0 of the original technological line.Indeed, after deflating by
y", the expected output of this agent on the new technological line is equal to the expected output
on grade 0 of the original technological line. This deflated output is equal to I-i-u,2. Let y0 denote
his observation from the use of that grade. Then from (12)and(11)hisposterior belief over the
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next grade after observing Yo is N(m1,x1) where
&%1(i)y0/c2and x1B(i). (18)
Hisexpected lifetime utility, discounted by yflis therefore given by
i-k-aw2+ôyEV1(m1,x1) , (19)
where Fa denotes expectations over the random variable m1 defined in (18). u0 is the value to the
young of "RomeUalone" - when not hired by a foreman. This is in units discounted by yfl,
Implicit in (19) is a stationarity assumption which says that calendar time matters only in as much
as it affects production possibilities. We say more about this in section 5.
3.2c. Young agents are perfect substitutes, Old agents are not; they have leaned a specific skill.
In particular they have information on a technological line.For now we assume that all the rents
from the partnership go to the old.Later on we show that some young agents are not hired in
equilibrium. Competition then results in the old receiving all the rents. This implies that in
equilibrium the value to the young from being hired, i.e., (17), will equal the return from going it
alone, (19).This implies that
C = I-i-a.)+ôy{EV1(m1,x1)-E5[V1(m1,B(xj)]}. (20)
Putting this value of c0 into the foreman's problem (16) and simplifying implies that
V,(m,x)l-x-a2 + Max (0, g - m2} , (21)
where g is independent of m and is given by
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= i-x,+8y[EaV,,j(m',B(xp))] -EaV;(mt,B(k))]}. (22)
Supposethat theforeman is of type (m,x) with m=O. Then that foreman would himself set
z0when operating his technology. A young agent using his technology always sets m=O. The
expression g, above is the net output such a foreman receives fromtheyoung, E(l-y2)-c,.If theold
isof type (m,x) with that old person would prefertheyoung to choose the decisionzrm.
However,the young always choose action z=O. As far as the old is concerned,theyoung would be
making hlnisukeswhenoperating his technology. The total net output that the old receive fromthe
young if hired, is g,-m2. The amount -m2 therefore represents the losses or costs due to the mistakes
ofthe young. If these are large the old will then decide notto hirethe agent.
Aforeman of type (m,x) will therefore hire a young agent at date it if g-m2> 0 (and will be
indifferent between hiring andnothiring if equality holds). We define
E (g,)"2 if g5> 0, and
z 0otherwise. (23)
A foreman oftype(rn,x) will file a young agent whenever m lies in the set A(x) [-ñi5(x),i(x)].
We call if,(x) a hiring rule, andA(x)a hiring set. A foreman is more likely to hireayoung agent
the smaller is the foreman's Imi.
The A(x) correspondence defines the hiring set in(m,x) space, andit isshown as the
shaded areainfigure 2.Recall that g is the fixed point of the operator B. Since B(i) Ci, and
[3(x) is as shown in figure I, the sequence B(i) declines monotonically fromi to 1asshown
inthis figure. This is whyinfigure 2, values of x belowor above i could not arise.
[figure 2 about here].
At the date 0 wesupposethat the old at that date have the same beliefs about the technology
as do the young. In particular, in0 =0 andthevariance of in9 is zero. The young receive no extra





Figure2: The Hirin2 Set.Jovwwvic and Nya.rko TheTransfer of HumanCaplial
informationafter using the technology of the old at that date as opposed to going it alone. If indeed
the young were hired they would be paid an amount when young, c5, equal to what they would
receive from going it atone l-c)- £
3.3. The Transfer of Information Along a Technological Line First consider the following slight
digression. Suppose two agents A and B have the same prior over some parameter 0. Suppose A
receives some information and forms a posterior over 0. Suppose that B does not receive that
information but observes the posterior of agent A. What then is B's posterior over 0? It will of
course be equal to the posterior of A. Despite not knowing precisely the information of A, B says
to himself "any information that A could have seen would lead me to have a posterior equal to the
announced posterior of A since I have the same prior as A. Hence, despite the fact that 1 did not
see A's information, my posterior is the same as that of A."
The agent who is young at date 0 has a prior N(0,k) over 00. That agent then observes y0
and uses this to form a posterior over 0, and hence over 0. His posterior over O is then N(m1,x,).
Suppose he hires at date 1 (or more precisely the first period in the life of the technological line) and
announces m1 to the young at date I.The young at that date do jg see yi; only m1. What will
be that agent's belief over 0? From the argument made earlier, the young at date I will have the
same posterior, N(m1,x1), over 0 as the old at date I.In particular, observation of m1 is equivalent
to observation of y0 as regards forming a posterior over 0. We may extend this argument inductively
to each period n. In particular, consider the young who observe ma, the posterior mean over 0 of
the old.Conditional on observing ir,, the young will have a posterior over 0, which is N(rnxj.
In particular, the young will inherit the beliefs of the old. Furthermore, the belief of the young
conditional on observing m is the same as the beliefs that the young would have if they had
observed all of the signals Y.1{y0yy51} that all agents of earlier periods had observed on that
technological line. m, is a sufficient statistic for the entire information vector Y1.
A foreman using a grade ii will therefore have a posterior variance over the parameter en
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equal tox,,=B(i). The value function of the foreman is therefore a function only of his prior mean
m0 and the age of the technology. We define
andA,A11(B'(k)). (24)
and use this new notation throughout.
4. The mj't1 Process
4.1.Suppose that the posterior belief over 0 is N(m0,x,J. From (12) and (3), after the signal y
has been observed rn0,.1, the posterior mean over 011+1, is given by
m01 =a"2h1(xj{m,/; + ((00+wJ/o2}. (25)
Conditional on rn,, the posterior over 0,, is N(rn,x.J. Hence conditional on m11,rn01 is normal
with mean and variance given below:
E[m01jm,] = a"2h1(xjm{l/x, + 1/o2} = a"2ni0 ;
. (26)
Var m,1IrnJ = [a"2h1(x3]2(Ifa2f[x,+a2]=ah1(x1J(1Io2)c; and (27)
2 2 E[m0.1Im] = ah1(xj(lfa ,x, + am . (28)
Equations (26) and (27) completely describe the distribution of m conditional on m11, which we
denote by Prob (.Irnj.The unconditional variance of m11 is given by the recursion
Var rn041 = ah(çJ(l/a2); + ccVar m, andVar m0 = 0. (29)
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We define
Ea=E[.JAAj, (30)
to bethe expectation operator over the {m},, process conditionalon some hiring sets A 1,..,A,where
A=[- 'r' thr] forsome rn>O. (This operator was introduced in (17).)
Wenow have the following:
Proposition 4.1:Fix any n.
(a) Prob [m,12 5m01 m0 =mJ decreases as ml increases.
(b) For each ii, Prob mn,t2 SmJ nift Sm] decreases as lml increases.
(c) The distribution of rn,,12(resp. ImR,Il) under the probability defining the conditional
expectations E[.lmthJ first order stochastically dominates distribution of rn12(resp.
m,.J) under the probability defining Ea in (30) where A,'[- iIiTP th,].
Corollary 4.2.: The distribution of any increasing monotone transform of m241 (e.g., lma+ ) is
also similarly stochasticatly increasing in rnI .In particular all statements in Proposition I also
hold when rn2,,1 is replaced with an increasing monotone transform of m21.
Remark: Fix m0 and rn.Prob (m2,.1Smjm,=rn)can not be similarly ordered in terms of n.
3.2. The voune AEent's Lx ante beliel about m.Consider a young agent who is considering
whether or not to work with a foreman who has a technology of vintage n.What will be that
agent's betief about the value of the posterior mean of the old agent, rn,.Note that this belief and
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(12) determines the young agents expectation operator E, over rn+1 which is what was required in
(17) to state the return to the young from working with the old.
The young will not use the unconditional distribuaon, determined by (26) and (27) above to
form expectations over rn. The young agent knows the age, n, of the technology. This implies
that the foremen in previous periods all hired young agents. This in turn implies that the rn process
fell in the hiring set A in each of the previous periods of the life of that technological line. The
young agent will condition on this information in forming a beliefs about the value of m.
Fix a sequence of hiring sets A,=[-thfl,ift1. In particular, an old agent using a techology of
age n will hire a young agent if and only if his mean mn lies in the set A0. Let 002 be the variance
of rnconditional on knowledge that mr was in A, for r=On-I. This is the belief of an agent
whose only information is that the technological line has been alive in periods r0,ln-I. Then we
have
Proposition 4.3: o obeys the pair of inequalities




5. Existence and Properties of Euuilihrium: We now define an equilibrium for the model. Our
definition will implicitly require that some amount of hiring takes place on each grade n, at least for
the foreman with m=O. We show in appendix A that any equilibrium must be of this kind.
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Definition: An equilibrium is a sequence of wage rates (c0}..0 such that if we define
I-x,-o,2-c,,; A (rn2 S gj; V(m) l-xR-0W2-l-Max (O.g-m2); and ; 1-io2+EV1(m1)
then for each n=l,2
= cfl+ôyE[V,.1(m1)jAI....,Aj (no excess supply of young labor); (31a)
I -oJ-x-c,, a 0 (Hiring occurs on grade n for some rn values). (31b)
In the above m}01 is the stochastic process of means described in section 4.
It is easy to show that in any equilibrium the value functions {V8}0_1 obey the functional
equation in (21) and (22). Given an equilibrium. using the notation in the definition above we see
that the hiring rule is given by and the hiring set is given by A,, for each n.
In appendix A we show that equilibria exist Not only that, there are many equilibria. The
equilibria are indexed by the value of the age one value function at m=O, V1(0).In particular, for
each real number v greater than or equal to some critical value, which we refer to as V. there exists
an equilibrium with V1(O)v. (See remark RI of Appendix A.)
The unique equilibrium such that V1(0) = V will be referred to as the boundS equilibrium.
(See Remark R2 of appendix A.) bounded equilibrium has the following interpretation:Let
us consider a finite horizon equilibrium where we insist that the decision problem is the same as our
earlier description for all agents with technology of age n91+l, but where we insist that no hiring
is allowed on technologies of age N+l or larger. This means that we 'kill' all technologies precisely
when they get to age N+2, regardless of whether or not young agents would want to work on such
technologies.It turns out that there exists a unique finite horizon equilibrium of this sort. The
unique bounded equilibrium is the limit of the finite horizon equilibria, as the horizon, N, goes to
infinity.
Each equilibrium with V1(0) strictly greater than V will be such that
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lim. V(m)=for all m. (32)
We refer to such equilibria as Pouzi equilibria.
One thing that comes out of our construction of equilibria is:
Proposition 5.1.: In any equilibrium, the hiring rule, ñi, , is strictly positive for each n=l,2
and the hiring set An=[n,iiQ is a non-empty non-degenerate interval for each n.
Corollary 5.2:In any equilibrium, for each NCo, there exists a strictly positive probability that
the length of life of the technological line will exceed N.
Belowwe show that in any Ponzi equilibrium c0, the wage payment of the old to the
young for their labor tends to minus infinity so will eventually be negative. This means that the
young pay the old. This is in return for the information that the old will transfer to the young.
Proposition 5.3. In any Ponzi equilibrium lim c, =
It should be clear what is going on in the Ponzi equilibria. Suppose that at date 0 a young
agent starts a technological line.Any arbitrarily high value for the date one value function, VI,
may be obtained by setting c1 equal to some large negative number. The date one young are willing
to pay this amount because they expect that when they get old the young then will pay them back an
even higher amount.That even higher amount is justified by yet higher payments. Etc. Etc.
Regardless of whether we are in a bounded or Ponzi equilibrium, the lifetime payoff to ay
agent is equal to u0l-i-c2+oyEV1(m1).Hence despite the fact that along a given Ponzi
equilibrium V,(m) —. r, each agent receives the same finite discounted payoff of u0.The reason
for this is simple. Even though Vim) —. , so too does; —. -. The payoff to the agent who
is young at n is c,+ôyEV+1(ni÷,)=u0'Ca Implicitin all of the paper and indeed in the
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construction of equilibria above is the following: We nile out equilibria of.a particular type. We
do not consider equilibria where the age-one value function, V,(m),depends uponthe date. Suppose
that from dates I through T technological line A is in used. At date T no young arehired on that
line and it dies. The young form a new technological line B at that date. Let V1A and V1ta denote
the age-one value function corresponding to technological lines A and B. Since we have multiple
equilibria it is in principle possible that at date T the young form a technologicalline with a different
associated Ponzi equilibrium than that of line A. In that case 0 V18.This is a form of time-
nonstationarity.Ifwe allowed forthis inequality we would then have to index our value functions
by not only the age of the technology, but also by the calender time. We rule outsuch time non-
stationarities.Note however that this does not imply in our model that V,,V+3.
6. The Planner's Problem
6.1. The planner wishes to maximize the discounted sum of utilities of all the generations starting
at date zero. This means he will maximize discounted aggregate output As in the case of
equilibrium, the planner's problem can be recast in a stationary form, with a discount factor of y6.
The only difference between the Planner's problem and the equilibrium solution is in the hiring
sets. The planner chooses the hiring set to maximize aggregate output of all generations. The
equilibrium hiring set is chosen to maximize the payoff of the foreman doing the hiring.In this
section we shall compare the hiring sets in the two situations.
in the equilibrium solution, the discounted aggregate output may be computed by adding the
output of each foreman to that of the lifetime output of the current and future young. The young
at any future date will have an expected output equal to " given in (19). The equilibrium utility
of an old agent with technology of grade n and beliefs represented by (m,x) was denoted by V(m,x).
The equilibrium lifetime utility of the young agent is u0.Hence the equilibrium utility of the
foreman of type (m, x) plus the discounted lifetime utility of the young agent that he interviews,
plus the discounted output of the agent that this young agent interviews in the subsequent period, and
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so on into the infinite future,isquaI to
W5t(m)EV(m) uj(l-ôy). (33)
Thevalue of \V,edoesnotrepresent themaximum possible discountedoutputstream.Theplanner
will wish to follow a hiring policy that will, as a function of m and x, maximize the analog of
The planner has the same information as the foreman does; that is, he knows m and x.
If a foreman of type (m, x) hires a young agent, the planner's expectation of their joint output is
2 2 2 2 [l-x-o;]+ [1-m -x-o ]= 2(J-x-o)- m. (34)
Iftheyoungagentis towork alone, the planner mustassignhima randomnewtechnological line,
and so heexpects thejoint outputofthe two agentstobe
{l-x-a2] +[l (35)
Let W(ni) be the planner's expectation of the infinite sequence of such pairs of outputs. It solves
the equation
Wjm) = Max {2(l-x-o_1 ) - m2 +
l-x-a2I - * a2 + AyEW1(m1)
(36)
where the first expectation is over mati given m (defined via (26) and (27)) and the second is over
m1 defined in(18).Using standard contraction mapping techniques it should be easy to see that
there exists a unique sequence of continuous functions {W}" satisf'ing (36).
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Lemma6.1: W,(m) is decreasing in Imiforeach fixed n.
Since thetop lineof(36) isa decreasing function of !mI,orequivalently,ofm1,whilethe
secondline of (36) does not depend on m, the planner will choose a cutoff value for ImI, call
itm,"and reject all matches for which ImJ exceeds this value:
rn001' {t-x,+ 8y{E[W(m,,i)Imn0hiEWj(mi)}}. (37)
The equilibrium hiring set cutoff, thu, is given by (23):
in, = {-x (38)
From (33) this becomes
fri = (k—; +ôy {Ea[Wtnti(m,i+i)I—EaWt'(mj} }112. (39)
Since WI istheoutcome of socially optimal decisions,
W,(m) ?W'(m) for all m. (40)
Recall that E, in (38) represents expectations over rn,1 conditional only on information that the in.
fell in the hiring set, Ar1 in each of the previous periods in the life of the current technology line.
Consider a planner at some fixed date t observing the equilibrium in process. At that date
the old will be using a technology of age n.Suppose that the planner knows the value of rn. of
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the old agent using that technology. If the planner had the opportunity to change the hiring decision
at that date only, would the planner choose to increase or to decrease the hiring set? It turns out that
the planner would want to decrease it!
Letrn, be theoptimal hiring rule under the conditions just mentioned.The planner 's
value functionis then givenbythe relation analogous to (36):
W(m)Max{2(1_,c.a2)-in2 ÷6yE[W'+1(m,,+1)lm],
1-c-a2+ I-* -a ÷ ÔyEW1(m1)}
(41)
Eq. (41) emphasizes the problem of the planner in our experiment The planner is deciding
the decision rule for a technology of age n at some fixed date t.Given in the planner must decide
whether or not to allow a young to be matched with a foreman with mean in, or whether to inform
the young to go it alone. If the young is hired at date t, then in each subsequent date the equilibrium
is played out. Hence we see the equilibrium value function W.1t on the top line of (41).Suppose
on the other hand the planner recommends that no young are hired by the foreman of type m. Then
the young goes it alone.If we suppose that young agents re-start the equilibrium outcome, then
Vv' on the second line of (41) is the equilibrium infinite horizon value function; i.e. W1 = W1c.
If alternatively the young star-up the planner's problem, then W1 = W1. From (40) we therefore
have that in either case
W1(m) S W3(m) for all m. (42)
Using Corollary 4.2 in addition to arguments similar to that of Lemma 6.1, it is easy to see that the
top line of (41) is decreasing in ml. The second line in (41) is independent of m. Hence the
solution to the problem in (41) and (42) is characterized by a hiring rule m." ￿ 0. The planner will
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recommend that the young be hired whenever m lies in (m,m.*1, and will recommend no hiring
when m, lies outside of this interval.
We now have the following:
Proposition 6.2: Suppose that the planner may make a one time change in the hiring rule.In
particular suppose that the planner is solving the problem characterized by (41) and (42) for some
fixed n at some date t.Then the planner will choose to reduce the hiring set; i.e., m.' S iii,,. The
inequality is strict whenever frt,>O.This means that if there is ever a non-trivial amount of hiring,
that amount hiring is excessive.
[Figure3about here].
Proposition 6.2istrue because the informational asymmetry between foremen and young
agentsgives rise to an adverse selection problem. The marginal technology,hg, is the worst
among continuing technologies. When he hires, the marginal foreman ignores the fact that he is
contaminating the distribution of surviving technologies. Therefore, in equilibrium, there is a
tendency to stick too much to old methods and the startup rate of new technologies is too low.
6.2. Implementine the optimal policy. The planner can implement the optimal limited intervention
policy without knowing any of the m's. If he chooses to intervene at the point at which technologies
are n periods old, equation (38) implies that he can induce old agents to be indifferent between
hiring at m = mB* by imposing a hiring tax r given by
= - (g;S)2
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7.OverlacpinGenerations LearningVenus Frictionless Learning. How well does the 00
mechanismapproximate learning by, say, an infinitely-lived individual who sees the same evidence




Wecall this the overlapping generations (00) case.
Alternatively, suppose that an infinitely lived individual sees the signals of both the young






since there are now two signals per period, and there is no truncation (i.e., ñ co). We call this the
frictionless case.
The situation is shown in figure 4. The top two lines are straight, with slope a. The bottom
line has slope zero. As x, declines, all three lines in figure 4 shift down, but if all are evaluated
at the same ;, their relative positions remain unchanged. Equation (44) implies that for c?
given, must, in the 0(1 case, lie in the shaded area. So from any fixed prior variance ;, the
frictionless case involves faster learning, which is reflected in the greater height of its curve, and a
more rapid growth in q2 . The least learning (none!) occurs for the case a = 0, in which case
a101=Q for all n, for both the 00 and the frictionless cases.
[Figure 4 about here].
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Iij ti
450Jovanovic and Nyarko The TransferofHumanCapital
The fasterlearning in the frictionless case also implies a lower ; sequence. From equation




whereas in the frictionless case it is
2
2
These two curves are drawn in figure 5; the top one pertains to the 00 case. Taking * as the initial
condition for both cases implies that at each date ; is higher for the 00 case, and it must also have
a higher limit, denoted by i, as opposed to for the frictionless case. Output and productivity
are, at each date, both lower in the 00 case, not just at each date, but in the limit as well.
[Figure 5 around here}.
Iftherewere no upgrading, the productivity differences between the 00 and the frictionless
case would disappear in the long run, because even 00 learning would eventually perfectly reveal
the parameter(s) of interest. But because of continual upgrading, ignorance about O is always there,
but it is permanently larger in the 00 case. In the limit, both economies grow at the rate y-l, but








Figure 5:Evolutionof x. in the two cases.
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8.Productivity, Failure, and the EarninE-Experience Profile
8.1. Productivity and Failure If an old agent does not hire anyone, his technological line will end
one period later. We define "failure" to be the cessation of hiring. In this model, less productive
technologies are the more likely to fail. WhenImiCII ,outputper man of the two-agent team
is
2
1 2 2i 2m -4l-x-o.l-x-o-m)I-x-o.-—1 a q,(m)
Theprobabilitythat the finn will failnext period is
-rn-a"21n iii-a"2m
Qjm) G ______ +- C'"
a "h1(x)xJa,
where'V is the normal cumulative distribution function. The function Q0(m) is increasing in Imi.
Therelevant values of Imi are those below ñ, and here q1 and Qarenegatively related as Imi
varies.This is shown in figure 6. This implication fits the stylized fact that less productive firms
are more likely to fail. The economics is that such firms fail because they find themselves in
technologies that young agents find hard to assimilate; this may well be an important cause of failure
in high-tech industries.
[figure 6 about herel.
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8.2. Human Capital and the Eanlin2s- ExperienceProfile. Old agents who operate older
technological lines have higher productivity because they have a lower ; W'(SØ.Whenhired




When old,thisagent'sexpected consumption willbe E,V÷1(m). Hence the age-expected earnings




On the right-hand side, only V,÷1depends onn, and so theslope of the age-earnings profile will
berelatively highin an age-n technology if its V4 is relatively high.
9.Conclusion
We have modelled training, learning by doing, and production as joint activities. Training,
however, occurs only if a young agent works togethec with an older one, anditconsists of the
younger agent watching the older one do the job. In equilibrium, some young agents startnewfinns
ontheir own, while others join an older agent as apprentices. Apprentices give up partoftheir output
in return for the training that they get from older agents, training that will raise their second period
productivity
The overlapping generations model differs radically from the single agent infinite horizon
model studied in Jovanovic and Nyarko (1994). First, there is an avoidable adjustment cost --
modelled as waiting time -- in the process by which knowledge is transferred from the old to the
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young. This leads to a permanentlylowerproductivity in the overlapping generations model. Second,
the non-Ponziequilibriumis constrained inefficient, in that too few new startups take place, and too
many old technologies are kept alive. This is because the informational asymmetry between the old
and the young gives rise to an adverse selection problem: an older agent with inferior skills pays his
apprentice a wage that reflects not his own skills, but rather the skills of the average old agent.
10.AnnendixA: Construction and Properties of Equilibria.
In the construction below, the reader may find figure 7 useful. First, we provide a summary of what
is to come. We first define by induction a sequence of non-negative numbers {r0}",,_1anda
sequence of functions Gn:[ri,)—.R for n1,2 We will then define for each g1>O sufficiently
large, the sequence of numbers {g}1 by setting gftGfl(gj. This sequence of numbers will then
be shown to define an equilibrium.In particular, we obtain a multiplicity of equilibria with each
equilibrium indexed by g1. Now the details!
For each g1>O define
-
U1(g1)8yE1[Max {O,g1-m12}} (46)
where the expectation E1 is over the distribution of m1. Define for each n1,2
= t-x.a4ôy{k-;.j) and (47)
H(g1)=
h0-U1(g1). (48)
Note that for each n, H(O)>O, H(g1) is strictly decreasing in g1 and Hjg1)_._r3 as
Define I'O and G1(g1)g1 on [I'0.ce). We proceed by induction. Suppose that for some
Nal we have defined the non-negative numbers r0,rrN.land the functions G0:[I'.11"')—.R for
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nH N, with G(g1) strictly increasing, taking the value 0 at g1=F01 andat g,=Co. Note that we
have already shown this for N I.Define r>obethe unique number such that G(g1)-H(g1)=0
atg1randG$(gJ)-H(g1)>0 at each g1>F. From the properties of HN and °N such a N>0 exists.
Define UN.!:RtNxR. — R by
= ÔYEN+I[MaX {O,gfl÷1-m12}IAJ,...,AN] (49)
where the expectation above is with respect to the distribution of mN+I conditional on the events
A,= ( for nl N.For fixed g1?0, thefunction UN÷l( . ,g) of SN+l
zero at gI=°, and is strictly increasing taking the valueat g1• Define the function
—. R as follows: for each gI?I' let G+1(g1) be the unique value of g÷1 such that
= G(g1)-Hjg}). (50)
From the properties of the UNI and 0N(g!)-1-1fl(gj) just mentioned, it should be easy to see that the
function GN., (gj is well-defined on [I'N,Co), and is strictty increasing taking the value 0 at g)=F+1
and co at g=hD
Hence by induction we have constructed a sequence of numbers anda sequence of
functions with G0:[r,.1,co)—..Rstrictlyincreasing from 0 to C. Since by construction r,
isthe value of g1 where H(g1=Q(g1). As n gets larger it should be clear (see fig. 7) that the
functions H, and G, both shift to the right. Hence F1.1cI'forall tel.Since H,(g1) increases
monotontically to it should be clear that 1', S H..0'(0) for all n. Hence lim.._40
= rexistsand is finite. Each of the functions G,(g1) for p21 is therefore well-defined on [r.0,Co).
[Figure7 about here].
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Fix any g1￿r..Definefor each n>O, g,—G(g1)andffi,=g"2.Define
V(m) la2-; ÷ Max {O,g-mfl2}where ;=B°(xj. (51)
Equating(49) and(50)results in
=Hjg1)+




VN(m) = l-a2-x + Max {O,l-aW2-xN-m2-cfl} where
c, E -i-o2-O y {EN.I[VN+,(mNfI)IA I,...,AN]]- E1[V1(m1)]}.
Sincewemaywrite ç above as
;=u0-oy (EN[VN÷I(mN4J)IA ,...,AN]] where uøl-i-a2+6yE1[V1(m1)]
it should be clear that our constructionsatisfies the definition of an equilibrium. Hence each g1?r..
definesan equilibrium. •
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Remarks:
RI: (Multiplicircof Equilibria) Fromthe above construction we have a multiplicity of equilibria
indexed by g1 in the set [r,Gc).Notethat g1 and V1(O) are related by the relation V1(0) =
-i-g1.When g1=J',V!(0)I-xI-uW2+rE,say.Hence we could equivalently index the equilibria
by the value of V1(0)solong as it lies in the set [,°).
IC: (The UniqueBounded Infinite-Horizon Equilibrium): Theequilibrium from g1F.issuch that
iiV0 denotes the associated value functions then lim,_,0 V0(m) S K for all m, where K is a constant
independent of n.(Indeed Kl-iç-o2+hJ(1-óy).) This is the content of Proposition 10.1 below.
\Ve mention in the remark R3 below that all equilibria from gj>Fc.willhaveurn0..,,, Vjm) =a for
all m.Hence the equilibrium associated with g1=1',,istherefore referred to as the bounded
equilibrium.Proposition 10.1 cbtains the bounded equilibrium via a construction which enables us
to interpret it as the limit as NC—cc of N-horizon equilibria. The latter are equilibria where we insist
that the decision problem is the same as the earlier analysis for all agents with technology of age
n5N-l-l, but where we insist that no hiring is allowed on technologies of age N+l or larger. This
equilibrium is obtained by setting g1r,andg,=G(g1) for n=l,2 N+1. (In this case g1=O and
C](g1) is not well-delined for rN±1.) There is a unique N-horizon equilibrium of this type. The
unique bounded equilibrium is the limit of the finite horizon equilibria as the horizon, N, goes to
infinity.
R3 (ThePonzi Equilibria):Inproposition 10.2 below we show that for each equilibrium
corresponding to a g1 strictly greater than I'. will have an unbounded limiting value function, i.e.,
lim0...,,V,(m)=co for all n.We refer to these equilibria as Ponzi equilibria.
R4 (Rulingout Equilibria where there is never hiring on some grade):
Supposethat in an equilibrium there is some hiring on grade n but no hiring on grade n-I-i. Hiring
on grade n (by the Ibreman of type mrO) implies that I -;-a2￿ c (i.e., firms want to hire) and
e,+óyE,V0.1(m,i) = c+6y[l-x0,1-oi (i.e., the young want to be hired) which implies that
31Jovanowic and Vywko mcTnnstr of Human Capital
u0-ôy[l-x1-ol-x-a.,2. (52)
For there to benohiring on grade n+l, l-x-a2 S c1 and u0? cn+l+oy[l-x-awl which implies
thatl-x0,1-o2 S u0-8y[l-x,roi.However since xu+l<x.a.I<; , this is easily seen to be a
contradiction to (52). Hence if there is hiring on grade i there is also hiring on grade n+I.
It therefore remains only to show that there is hiring on grade 1.Suppose, per absurdem
there is no hiring on grade I.Then it is easy to see that (52) holds for n=O if we define ;4.
Mimicking the previous argument shows that assuming there is no hiring at date I leads to a
contradiction to equation (52) with n0. Hence in any equilibrium there is hiring on each grade. S
Proposition 10.1.Forall n1,2G,(r)ChJ(1-ôy) <. In particular, if {ñ,V1}'°1 is the
equilibrium associated with g1 =as constructed above, then for each m, V1(m) S lxa2+
hJ(l-ôy)< co
Proof of Proposition 10.1: For each n, it is easy to see that G0(g1) is continuous on [r3,co).We
will later on show that
Gfl(rN) S h,,/(l-ôy) for each n and N with N>n. (53)
The [list part of this proposition therefore follows immediately from taking limits as Nco in (53).
The second part of the proposition follows immediately from the first part and the definition of V0(m)
in (51).
We now prove (53). Fix any Nccz,.Define g1=F and gG,(g1) for all n1,2 N+I.
From the earlier construction we know that such g1,..,g is well-defined with g+1O. Further,
= U,+1(gfl+1.gJ)+Hfl(g1) for each n1,...,N. (54)
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However,from the definition of 1J1 in(49),U÷1(g,,1.g1)S6yg1.Also from (48), H0(g1) S h,..
Hence(54) becomes, g,, S 6yg,÷1+hforall n=l ,...,N.This is equivalent to
SôygN4+h,.forallr0,1N-i. (55)
Define qçgç.1 for all rrO,iN-I. Then (55) becomes
Sôyq,+h.. for all r=O,iN-I. (56)
Note that q0 = g1=O. Define the linear function f:R—.R by f(q)(ôy)q+h,,. Iterates under this map
from the origin will always remain below the fixed point, hJ( l-oy), of this mapping.Since the
right hand side of (56) is f(qj, we conclude that q, S hJ(l-öy) for all r=O,1N-I.Thisin turn
implies (53). N
Proposition 10.2.: Fix any g1 strictlygreaterthan F,..Then lirn,,. ()1(g1) = In particular, if
(i,V}°, is the equilibrium associated with any g1 > F,. as constructed above, then for each m,
lini,0 V1(m) = c0
Proof of Proposition 10.2.: The second part of the proposition follows immediately from the first
part and the definition of V(m) in (51). We now prove the first part of the proposition. We will
later on show that
dG(gjfdg1 ? l/(ôy)'for all n￿I and at each
g1 (57)implies that for all n, G0(g1)-G(F,.) a(g1-rj/(6y). Takinglimits as n—.
therefore implies that limT. _ G,(g1) = '. Since V0(m) l_a2; + Max {O,g,,-m2}, this implies that
We now prove (57) by induction. Since G1(g1)g1 we see that the claim holds for n=l. So
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assume that (57) is true for some n.Putting g0 =G(g1)in(50) implies that
Ufl+J(G÷J(g1),gJ) = G0(gj-H(g1). (58)
Totallydifferentiating this with respect to g, and using the fact that H is decreasing in g1 implies that
= dGjdg1 - dHjdg1. (59)
Using the induction hypothesis and the fact that dl-l,,/dg1 < 0 we conclude that
(dU,1/dg,1)(dG,+1/dg1)+(dU041/dg1) ￿ .l/(ôy)'. (60)
We vill later show that for all n,
O<dU1/dg,1Sby and dU÷1/dg1 <0. (61)
Putting (61) into (60) implies that dO41idg1 ￿ l/(oy)' which is the induction step for n+1. Hence
by induction this shows that (57) is true for all n.
We now prove (61). Fix any it? I.It should be clear from the definition of U in (49) that
for fixed g, an increase in g0 by one unit will increase U, but by no more than ô7 units. Hence
0<dU,1Jdg1l/ây. This proves the first part of (61). Now let us consider the effect of an
increase in g1 keeping g,1 fixed. For any r=1n, since 4(g1) is increasing in g1, an increase in
g1 has the effect of increasing the conditioning sets Ar 't is easily shown that this implies that the
variance of rn, will increase, with its mean remaining equal to zero.This in turn will lead to a
reduction in the value of the integral in (49) which defines U. In particular, an increase in g1
Leeping g,,,, fixed will result in a decrease in U1, so dU,/dg1 CO.This proves the second part of
(6l).
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II. Appendix B: Justification for Assumption (A.2. One implication of this assumption is that
each continuing technological lire will be upgraded in every period. In this appendix, we show that
such upgrading will be myopically optimal for some parameter values. Since old agents are by
assumption myopic, the term "myopically" refers to the young agents. In this sense, myopically
optimal policies maximize the expected output of the old and the young combined, but they ignore
the future value of the training that takes place during the period.
Assume that it is the old agent who decides on whether to switch or not switch, in addition to





If he doesn't hire, the old agent will prefer to switch if
l-x-o < y[l-ux-o-o] . (62)
If he does hire, he will prefer to switch if
2 If the young agent goes it alone, it is always optimal for him to start out on the latest available
technology. This is because k = at + a so that yE! - ax -- u9 always exceeds 1 - x -
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1-x-a,< y(l -ax-c-o) - (' 0m (63)
Clearly. 11(63) is met, then (62) is as well. 11(63) holds for some m2, then it holds for all m2 less
than that value. The largest possible m2 that, conditional on switching, will maintain the match is
the one that equates the output under going it alone to the output under the match:
—, 2 2 22 2
(m)2(l-ax-o-a) - (l-ax-o-o) -
2
2 • 2 x-ax-o￿x-o
.—
I-ct
Since & (z), substitution for m2 in (63) leads to the inequality
1-x-o C y(l-ax-a-o) (64)
2(1-a)
When I - o> 0, the term (I - ax -- 2) is strictly positive for small enough a and a.
Then (64) will hold when a and a2 are small enough and/or when y is large enough. So we
have proved:
Proposition 11.1: There exist parameter values under which it is myopically optimal for all agents
to upgrade their technologies in each period.
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12.Appendix C: The Proofs.
Prool of Proposition 4.1.:Let 4) be any density functionof some random variabletaking values
onthe real line.Suppose that 4) is symmetric about the origin and suppose that 4)(i) is strictly
decreasinginiii.Letcjbe the cumulative distributionfunction correspondingto 4). Fix any k>O
andanyMO.Then
I'roh ({(M+r1)2k)) = Prob((-k+Mi+M)) =(k+M)-ek+M). (65)
However,taking derivatives with respect to M in (65) yields
a/aM[Prob ({(M+)2Sk})] = 4)(k+M) - 4)(-k+M). (66)
Under the assumptions on 4) it is easy to see that for k>O and M>O. 4)(k+M) - 4)(-k+M)<O.Hence
weconcludethat Prob ({(M+1)2k))is decreasingin M.
Let 1] be normal with mean equal to zero and variance ah1(xJxJo2. From (65) and (66),
rn,_ is a random variable whose distribution conditional on m is the same as a "2m0+11.Fix any
k>O. Then
Prob ({m2,÷1SkIm,) = Prob (((a'm+i)k}Imj. (67)
Setting M=cx "1mg in our earlier argument shows that (67) is decreasing in m,. This proves part (a)
of our proposition.
(b) This follows immediately from part (a).
(c) Let ft. — K be any strictly increasing function. Since conditional on in, the distribution of rn111
is independent of the acceptance sets, we may write
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= E3[f(m2+1)IA1,...,AJ=E,[E[f(m+1)IxLJIA,A.J, (68)
where the outer expectation in the last term above is the expectation operator over m conditional
on the events A ,...,A. From part (a). the bigger is m the stochastically larger is the distributionof
i&,,,1. That distribution is therefore largest at ni,,, the largest value of m in A. Hence from (68)
we conclude that E5j1(m2,,+1)] S EJf(rn2,,+1)Im,,m,,]. Since f is an arbitrary strictly increasing function
this implies the conclusion of the proposition as regards rn20,1.Similar arguments prove the
conclusion involving mI .U




where ô is the truncation variance of m,,. Since a ? 0, and 0 5S o , the
claim follows. I
Proof of Proposition 5.3. This follows immediately from taking limits as n—' in (20), and using
the defining property of a Ponzi equilibrium. •
Proof of Lemma 6.1: Define C(NxR) (W:NxR — It such that W is continuous and bounded} and
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C(NxR)={W inC(NxR) which are decreasing in ImU.Then we may consider(36) as deftnining
for each Win C(NxR) a unique function (TW):NxR — R.It is easytocheck that when W is
continuousand bounded so is TW. Hence T:C(NxR) —. C(NxR)Further, T is a contraction
operator.It therefore has a unique fixed point in C(NxR). That fixed point is the function W(n,m)
= W,(m). From Corollary 4.2, it is easy to show that if W lies in C/NxR) then so too does 1W.
Hence T:Cd(NxR) —. C(NxR). The contraction mapping theorem therefore shows that W,(m) is
decreasing in ml. U
Proof of Proposition 6.2: From (41) and (39),
(6 y) [(m,- (th)2] = { E[Wtfl+I(mfltI)IfiiR*_ES[Wefl,I(mfl÷l)]) — {EtWi*(mi)_EW1C(mj}. (69)
From (42), this becomes
(6 y )'[(m,2(thJ2] 5E[Wt,+I(ma÷I)1th]-E,[Wtfl,t(rnfl+I)1. - (70)
II we let A ,...,A,, denote the equilibrium hiring sets, then
E,[WCfl+i(n\_t)]= EEB[W4+1(m,.1)ImJ]A1,...,A.J,. (71)
whereexpectations operator E[.jA11...,AJ is over m conditional on the hiring sets A ,A1,, and
E[.Im,} is that over m1 conditional on rn,,. From Corollary 4.2, the distribution of Im.+11
conditional on rn, is stochastically increasing in the absolute value of zn.From lemma 6.1,
W1(m) is decreasing in Imi. Since .,=[-ñi,,ffi,J, this implies that the right hand side of (71) is less
than E[Wt.1(m,1)j1]. Putting this in (70) implies that
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(ay)1[(m*2 - (iiiJ2J E[Wtn+t(mn+jlmat]— E[Wta+j(ma.jIñi.J. (72)
Suppose per absurdem that m > iii. Then the left handsideof (72) is positive.Further,
Corollary 4.2 implies that theright hand sideof (72) is negative. This is a contradiction. Hence mat
sth. •
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